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Abstract 
 
Charters are official commitments to quality and reform. Belgium introduced its 
Charter of the User of Public Services in 1993. The federal administration’s 
Copernicus reform began in 1999 and had a strong external outlook. It therefore may 
be considered as a second User Charter. In this article we focus on the administrative 
and political contingencies of the introduction of the two charters in Belgium. We 
show that actual administrative reform and political attention for administrative 
reform are distinct phenomena. Variations in political attention for reform depend on 
crises and on political realignment. Both charters were introduced in a period of 
disturbed relations between citizens and politics. The introduction of a User Charter 
and the launch of the Copernicus reform were definitely political events, and not 
merely administrative ones. A charter was needed to restore citizen-government 
relations. The charters, as pledges for reform, served as lightning rods for political 
discontent.  
 
Keywords: user charter, political crisis, administrative reform, reform rhetoric, trust in 
government 
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A TALE OF TWO CHARTERS: POLITICAL CRISIS, POLITICAL 
REALIGNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN BELGIUM 
 
In January 1993, the Belgian Federal government introduced its Charter of the User of 
Public Services. The User Charter was a culmination in a trend of gradual 
administrative reform in the late 1980s, and a common occurrence in many Western 
countries in those days (McGuire, 2002). 
A number of events and crises in Belgium lead to profound discontent among citizens 
and required symbolic action to reassure the population: a citizen’s charter between 
citizen and government was needed. Instead, the crises were discursively dismissed as 
merely a public administration-related problem, and were responded to by launching 
new pledges for reform. One of these reforms was formally wrapped as a user charter. 
As a Potemkinesque distraction the User Charter was launched as a lightning rod for 
public discontent, hiding the failure of political reform and redefining a political crisis 
as an administrative one. This redefinition of the problem, however, was only possible 
on a fertile soil, a soil that had been irrigated by some policy entrepreneurs that had 
administrative reform as part of their own political agenda.  
Belgium, however, also has a second user charter, though one that is not generally 
referred to as a charter. We define a charter as a pledge for quality improvement, 
rather than a listing of service quality standards. The large-scale Copernicus reform 
project of the federal public service that started in 1999 was different from most 
administrative reforms because of the extensive attention for communicating and 
marketing the reforms. Though not taking the usual form of a charter, the de facto 
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appearance of the Copernicus project did not differ from that of most public sector 
user charters. 
 
In this article we focus on the administrative and political contingencies of the 
introduction of the two charters in Belgium. Issuing a charter follows an 
administrative and a political logic. Administrative reform itself and political attention 
for administrative reform seem to be two different flows of innovation. 
We begin this article by outlining the flows of administrative reform at the Federal 
level in Belgium and focus on the entrance of the concept citizen in the reform 
dynamic. Subsequently we describe the content of both charters and document their 
eventual disappearance. We then analyse determinants for political attention for 
administrative reform (both in general and in relation to the two charters) and show 
how political attention may influence the appearance and content of the charters. We 
end by indicating changes in the political opportunity structure that have facilitated or 
hindered the implementation and survival of the charters. 
 
FROM AN ADMINISTRATIVE LOGIC TO A CITIZEN-CENTRED LOGIC: 
REFORM RENEWAL IN THE MID 1980S 
The mid 1980s and early 1990s were a period of great administrative renewal in 
Belgium (see the table in appendix 1 for an overview). This period meant a rupture 
with the past, because many new concepts were introduced that had not been used 
before in the country’s administrative and political culture (Stenmans 1999: 118). The 
gradual changes followed a decade of deathlike silence on administrative reform. 
Most of the initiatives occurred against the background of stringent cutbacks of public 
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expenditures and the diminution of the government debt, hence the modernisation of 
the civil service was part of a ‘crisis management’ strategy (Bouckaert et al. 1999: 
12). Modernisation followed a gradual and bottom-up path by installing, in 1987, 
Modernisation Cells/Cellules de Modernisation in each ministry. These cells had to 
initiate and support the reform initiatives. Between 1981 and 1989 various initiatives 
were launched to modernize the civil service (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004):  
 
 1985: Appointment of a State Secretary for the Modernisation and 
Informatisation of the Public Service added to the Prime minister 
 
 1987: Creation of modernisation cells in the different ministries 
 
 1987: Creation of a modernisation secretariat 
 
 1989: Creation of the college of Secretaries--General (the highest civil 
servants of the ministries). 
After 1991, the focus of the modernisation process changed. Although the public debt 
had largely decreased, macro-economic contingencies remained, but the focus shifted 
to the rewards and motivation system of civil servants. A Ministry of the civil service 
was created in 1995, and the old civil servants’ statutory regulations, which went back 
to 1937, were replaced. 
 
The citizen as motive for reform 
In the mid 1980s, Guy Lutgen, State Secretary for the modernisation and 
informatisation of the public services (1985-7) was one of the first to stress the central 
position of clients in the administration. Citizens had to be considered as clients, and 
not as subjects (Lutgen 1986: 14). In his influential Citizens’ Manifesto 
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(Burgermanifest, 1991), liberal politician, and later prime minister, Verhofstadt called 
for an emancipation of the citizen from the suffocating political, administrative and 
fiscal powers. He was one of the first to speak about a ‘gap’  between citizen and 
government and urged for a contract with the citizen (Verhofstadt 1991). The rise of 
the extreme right and of anti-system parties some months later in the 1991 Black 
Sunday elections was a shock for the political establishment. Politicians offered their 
own definition of the situation and respective solutions, but it was the Verhofstadt 
discourse on the gap between citizen and government that prevailed (Maesschalck et 
al. 2002). The citizen became the primary focus of political discourse, both as a 
rhetorical device and as an expression of genuine concern for quality service delivery. 
From the early 90s on, the motivation for reform was no longer only to make the 
public sector perform better, but to remedy citizens’  distrust in government 
(Bouckaert et al. 2004). After 1991, many initiatives were started to strengthen 
government’ s legitimacy (Bouckaert et al. 1999: 30). This is reflected in the nature of 
the reform initiatives during that period (for a detailed discussion, see Stenmans 
1999):  
 
 1991: Law on the formal motivation of administrative actions 
 
 1991: Introduction of the possibility for a preliminary injunction before the 
Council of State (administrative court)  
 
 1992: New privacy regulations 
 
 1993: Charter of the User of Public services  
 
 1994: Law organising the right of access to official documents 
 
 1995: Creation of the Office of Federal Ombudsmen  
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The Charter of the User of Public Services  
In December 1992, the Belgian Charter of the User of Public Services was introduced, 
and officially published in 1993 (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1993). The introduction of the 
charter was motivated by concerns for the apparent gap between citizens and 
government. The introduction of the charter seems to have been a political reaction to 
the 1991 elections (Staes and Legrand, 1998: 12). In 1998, the then Minister for the 
Civil Service André Flahaut, in an introduction to a book about the charter, defined 
the charter as  
 
a landmark in the history of federal government. At that moment there existed 
an important gap between the citizen and the public services. The Service 
Charter has emerged from a need to deepen the functioning of our democratic 
institutions and to give them a solid functional basis (Staes and Legrand 1998: 
7, own translation).  
 
Political need made that the charter was developed quickly, with minimal contribution 
by the administration. The Minister of Interior and the Public Service had the 
publication of the Charter immediately followed by a Circular Letter on the 
communication of the Charter. The Charter addressed the population in general, but 
particularly those actively involved in service delivery and those politically 
accountable. The focus of the Charter was on the federal level, although there was a 
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desire to extend it to all levels of government (Bouckaert 1995). The 15 principles of 
the Belgian charter are clustered around three main themes. 
 
<Place table 1 here> 
 
A reporting procedure on the progress of the initiatives was made compulsory for all 
ministries. The first report in 1994 concluded that further action was needed. There 
was a need for more coordination, an instrument for measuring user satisfaction 
(quality barometer) had to be designed, and a complaints procedure had to be 
established. The second report in 1996, evaluated the different action plans and the 
design of the quality barometer was launched (Bouckaert and Thijs 2003: 459). 
 
What has happened to the User Charter? 
The second evaluation report made clear that attention had shifted to a new set of 
priorities, only marginally related to the Charter. The third follow-up report (1999) 
demonstrated, though not in these words, that enthusiasm for the charter had 
disappeared. Many ministries found the writing of progress reports burdensome, and 
this was reflected in the quality of the reports. The third evaluation report was the last 
time an integrated report on the follow up of the charter was made (Bouckaert and 
Vandeweyer 1999: 210). Though still in effect, little is heard about it now, and the 
Charter certainly does not have the same status as most foreign charters. Most, if not 
all, Belgian citizens do not know or have never known the Charter (Torres and Pina 
2003). 
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The Copernicus reform as second charter 
With the charter gradually disappearing, Belgium was suddenly faced with a scandal 
that had an impact on the political world that was even deeper than that of the 1991 
election. In the summer of 1996, Marc Dutroux was arrested for the kidnapping of a 
young girl. Two girls were found alive in his house, and a number of children’ s bodies 
were discovered. Soon it became apparent that police forces had failed. Several 
months later a popular magistrate was taken off the case for having a perceived bias, 
and popular outrage peaked. The subsequent ‘White March’  was one of the biggest 
demonstrations the country had ever seen. The Dutroux-scandal managed to mobilize 
many citizens that had never been politically active and had never participated in 
demonstrations before (Walgrave and Rihoux 1998). The Eurobarometer opinion 
polls by the European Commission revealed just 18,7% of the population were 
satisfied with the way democracy worked, whereas this number had been at least three 
times as high before. 
 
<figure 1 here> 
 
These shattering events stimulated the government to take action, with a reform of the 
justice system and the chaotic police forces as the first priority. Reforms went slow, 
however, and were soon confronted with opposition. In April 1998, Marc Dutroux 
escaped from prison. Even though he was recaptured in just some hours, the political 
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establishment was shocked. The events speeded up reform initiatives, but their effect 
soon faded.  
Just before the 1999 elections, another scandal erupted. Serious forms of 
contamination in the food chain were discovered, and it soon turned out the 
administration was not prepared to handle the crisis. The proximity of elections made 
the ruling coalition lose power as a result of this crisis. Liberals, socialists and greens 
formed a purple-green coalition. Their government declaration was presented as a 
project to restore citizens’ trust (Federale Regering 1999). In it, reform of the justice 
system, police forces and public administration were featured prominently. The 
scandals were not the only reason for this policy. Administrative reform had always 
been a key issue in the liberal party’ s programme, be it that the topic was often framed 
in a negative way: reducing red tape, freeing the citizen from administrative burdens 
etc. (Verhofstadt 1991). 
The prime minister, Guy Verhofstadt, himself took the lead of a new ambitious 
administrative reform programme and he took Luc Van den Bossche-who was 
responsible for the successful transformation of the Flemish regional administration- 
aboard to implement the reforms as minister for the civil service and the 
modernisation of the administration. Another cabinet function was created tasked 
with administrative simplification. The reform programme was soon to be called 
Copernicus: as the astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus claimed that the earth was 
rotating around the sun instead of the other way round, the Copernicus reform 
initiative wanted to stimulate awareness that the administration is rotating around the 
citizen, and not, as had been the case in the past, that the citizen rotates around the 
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administration: Under the Copernicus plan it was made clear that without citizens, the 
administration has no reason to exist. 
 
While in the past most of the initiatives were launched on an ad hoc basis, lacking 
overall coherence and strategy, the Copernicus reform was a modernisation plan 
covering many fields of the federal civil service (Piraux 2004). For the first time since 
the major reform in the 1930s, administrative reforms were at the centre of 
government policy. The initiative was built on four main trajectories: 
 
 a modern HR Management 
 
 a restructuring of the ministries   
 
 a new budget- and control system 
 
 improved external and internal communication  
 
In spring 2000, the Federal Government organized a mass survey among the Belgian 
population on the administrative reforms. It was labelled a referendum to give it 
additional importance. All Belgian citizens over sixteen (8.2 million), received the 
two-page questionnaire. Though labelled as a survey, it was never the government’ s 
intention to actually survey the population, but to get confirmation for its plans. In 
fact, as a survey, it was heavily criticized for the enormous cost and for the way 
questions were formulated so that citizens could only answer in the affirmative and 
thus support the government’ s plans.  
The value of the initiative was not in the survey, but in the massive scale of it. The 
distribution of the survey and the accompanying booklet to all citizens was probably 
the largest communication initiative government had ever undertaken. At the same 
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time, the Copernicus reform received a lot of attention in the press. While the 1993 
User Charter was not or hardly communicated toward citizens, propagation of the 
reform plans was at the core of Copernicus (Gelders and Van de Walle 2005). The 
first User Charter was aimed directly at civil servants. The launch of the Copernicus 
reform can be considered as a second charter, in which it is made clear what citizens 
can expect from their administration. Bouckaert lists the possible functions of charters 
as ideological image building, symbolic policy and real management commitment. 
Charters are important as official commitment to modernisation processes (Bouckaert 
1995). A report on the Finish charter lists quality promises on top of the list of 
principles to be included in it (Ministry of Finance Public Management Departement 
1997). Rather than just propagating the reforms, the Copernicus initiative was -
because of the devotion of the prime minister himself and because of the massive 
communication- a pledge for administrative reform.  
 
 
Demise of the second charter 
Gradually, resistance against the reform plans emerged. Civil servants did not feel 
informed or consulted, labour unions warned against the erosion of life-long tenure, 
and there was growing disagreement among government coalition parties. Whereas 
the Copernicus reform was initially presented as a common project, political 
agreement on the content of this charter quickly crumbled. At the same time, media 
attention for the reforms diminished, and the reforms gradually faded into oblivion. 
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While quality newspapers still devoted some attention to the reforms, popular 
newspapers disregarded the reforms (Gelders and Van de Walle 2005). 
 
A new government came into power in 2003, and the minister responsible for the civil 
service no longer had the suffix modernisation of the administration in her title, 
reflecting the demise of the Copernicus reforms. The resistance was not so much 
directed at the reforms themselves, but rather at the symbolic aura the Copernicus 
reforms had received. One of the first acts of the new minister was to drop the name 
Copernicus and to react against one of the main problems in the reforms: the 
excessive use of external consultants. Reforms have thus been drastically reoriented.  
Furthermore, by dropping the name Copernicus, reforms have also lost their external 
dimension. Together with the practically absent media-attention, this means the 
second Charter no longer exists. 
As with the 1993 Charter, one did not manage to keep reforms on the political agenda. 
For the User Charter, this was because there was no agreement on whether in-depth 
reforms were necessary, for Copernicus because there was no agreement on the 
content and direction of the reforms. The strengths of the Copernicus reform -its 
external communication and clear project- soon turned out to be its weaknesses. 
 
POLITICAL ATTENTION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 
The two charter-like initiatives in Belgium in the 1990s came as a consequence of an 
evolution that had started in the mid-1980s. Yet, while the reforms these charters 
stood for or propagated were part of this general evolution toward administrative 
reform, the charter-like character of the initiatives were a direct consequence of a 
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number of crises. The two charters were formed during moments where political 
attention for administrative reform culminated. Political attention should not be seen 
as a consequence of the actual content or scope of the reforms: some reforms are 
launched, supported and propagated with a charter, while others are not. Political 
attention for administrative reform moved unevenly with actual reform. While 
political attention stimulated reform, an absence of political attention did not 
necessarily hinder reform. We can identify seven stages in the Belgian political-
administrative reality from the 1980s to the present day, as the figure shows: 
 
<place figure 2 here> 
 
A: Late 80s: After a long standstill, reform projects, such as the Modernisation 
Cells/Cellules de Modernisation are gradually implemented. These reforms have 
an internal focus and do not attract much political attention. 
B: ’ 91-’ 93: A political crisis shakes the political world. This political crisis leads to 
an increased political attention for administrative reform. The User Charter is 
introduced. Reforms continue along the same path, and are perhaps a bit 
accelerated. 
C: ’ 93-’ 94: Political attention for reform withers, and reforms slow down. 
D: ’ 95-’ 99: Under the new minister, administrative reform is considered a non-
issue. The reform dynamic slows down. 
E: ’ 99: A number of crises have just occurred, and the liberal party comes to 
power. Administrative reform moves to the centre of government policy. Many 
reform initiatives are started. 
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F: ’ 99-’ 03: The initial enthusiasm withers. Reforms continue, but at a lower pace. 
Political disagreement increases and makes the issue gradually disappear from the 
agenda. 
G: ’ 03: The Copernicus project is declared dead. Administrative reform, however, 
continues but at a lower pace, and with an internal focus, thus without the reform 
rhetoric. 
 
CRISES AS WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY? REDEFINING CITIZEN 
CHARTERS AS CUSTOMER CHARTERS 
The occurrence of two crises in the 1990s preceded a boost in attention for 
administrative reform (Brans and Hondeghem 1999). The first crisis in 1991 - due to 
the breakthrough of the extreme-right in elections and a number of political scandals - 
soon gave rise to the gap between citizens and government, and set the scene for the 
introduction of the User Charter. The second crisis, a food safety scandal, coupled 
with the memory of the 1996 Dutroux paedophilia scandal that exposed the 
malfunctioning of the police and the courts, stimulated the launch of the Copernicus 
reform project. In this second crisis, however, the change of political personnel helped 
to frame the problem, as we will show in a later section on political realignment. 
 
Black Sunday: how a political crisis became an administrative challenge 
The 1991 elections resulted in a breakthrough for the extreme right. The election was 
soon referred to as Black Sunday, and was retroactively defined as the expression of a 
wide gap between citizen and politics. The gap between citizen and government had 
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not been a topic for discussion before, yet moved to the core of political debate in just 
months. All of a sudden, an existing situation was defined as problematic. The 
quarterly opinion poll by the La Libre Belgique newspaper contains a question on 
citizens’  trust in government: ‘To solve the actual problems in Belgium, do you have 
confidence in the government of [name prime minister]’ . Detailed results for the early 
1990s are shown in figure 3.  
 
<place figure 3 here> 
 
Levels of trust in government were rather stable in the late 80s. The November 1991 
Black Sunday elections resulted in a dramatic rise of the extreme right. In the March 
and June 1992 polls (four and seven months after the elections) there were no real 
changes in levels of trust. The real shock would come in September 1992. This means 
that the crisis of confidence came into existence as a result of its entry in the political 
debate. Even though November 1991 is generally seen as the breakthrough of the 
extreme right, it was the 1989 elections for European Parliament that showed the first 
strong rise of the party. At that time however, these signs were not interpreted or 
defined as problematic. The new gap between citizen and politics hence is as much a 
social or political construction than it was a genuine innovative change (Van de Walle 
2004; Berger and Luckmann 1966). 
This political definition of the situation called for a response to the crisis. The crisis of 
distrust in Belgium emerged from a political event, but discussion rather quickly 
shifted to administrative reform because these reforms were deemed to be more 
feasible (or easier) than political reforms. The way the problematic situation had to be 
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understood was transformed by the central actors in this problematic situation, where 
the party supposed to give account started to make its own accounts by highlighting 
alternative aspects in the debate (i.e. the malfunctioning of the public administration) 
(Dubnick 2005). 
 
The User Charter was mainly prepared in the political cabinets, without much input 
from the administration. As the urgency of the political crisis dissipated, the Charter 
was scaled back from being a political issue to an administrative issue, and prospects 
for reform disappeared from the political agenda. Once published, there was no 
administrative structure in place to do the follow-up. Absence of organized attention 
made the probability that the charter would disappear from the agenda rather high 
(Laegreid and Roness 1999: 310). Once introduced, attention for the charter had 
started to vanish, except for a small group of civil servants active in the Office for 
Modernisation and Organization (ABC), who would try to keep charter-related issues 
on the agenda, but who finally failed due to a lack of resources (Dierickx 2003). The 
gradual path of reforms that had started in the mid-80s would no doubt have lead to 
some kind of User Charter anyway, though not necessarily that early. In that case, it 
would have had a stronger administrative support. 
 
Dioxin chickens as election agenda setters 
A second series of crises consists of the Dutroux-paedophilia crisis, exposing the 
malfunctioning of the police and the courts, and the dioxin food safety crisis, that 
indicated the failure of food inspection services and lead to a massive contamination 
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of poultry. Reform of the police forces and courts, however, was seriously hindered 
by political disagreement. The outbreak of the dioxin crisis just before the 1999 
elections contributed to a loss of the ruling Christian-Democrat and Socialist 
coalition. The strong party in the new government (VLD) immediately announced that 
reform of the administration would be one of the main challenges. 
The crises in the second half of the 1990s caused profound distrust. Politicians 
interpreted the massive White March in 1996 as an expression of profound distrust, 
and as a call for structural reform of the police and justice system. There obviously 
was a crisis, and that crisis was soon interpreted as a political crisis, calling for a new 
contract between politics and the citizen. The emergence of the food safety scandal 
just before elections made administrative reform a rallying point in the last weeks of 
the election campaign. Again, what was essentially a political crisis was just after the 
elections re-defined from a political crisis between citizens and politics/the state to a 
crisis between citizens and the functioning of the state apparatus, i.c. the public 
administration. The new Copernicus administrative reform programme was presented 
as an encompassing reform that would make Belgium ‘a model-state’ . Guy 
Verhofstadt, in an interview some months after becoming prime minister declared:  
 
If there is one thing I have experienced over the past two months, it is the 
malfunctioning of the public administration. There are of course fantastic 
people working there, but the Dutroux-crisis, the dioxin-scandal, and many 
small stories you can read about every day, show how defective government 
works. Changing this will be the gigantic task for the years to come. (X 1999, 
own translation). 
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Both charters (the User Charter and the Copernicus reform) saw the light in the direct 
aftermath of a political crisis. This is not as remarkable as it may seem, as most 
administrative reforms in Belgian history were propelled by political events; for 
example the 1848 elections and the change these brought about in the political 
landscape stimulated the first discussions on political-administrative relations in 
Belgium. Ducpétiaux in his classic study on administrative reform in the 19th century 
used administrative reform to refer to reforms both in the political and in the 
administrative sphere (Ducpetiaux 1955(1859)). The reforms in the 1930s resulting in 
the path breaking civil servants statute, the statut Camu, were also to a large extent 
motivated by discontent with the organisation of the political system at large. The 
reforms came at the height of internationally turbulent political and economic times. 
The economic crisis made reform possible, since the large bureaucratic apparatus was 
draining much of the state funds. Increased attention for administrative reforms from 
the 60s on coincided with appeals for granting more autonomy to the regions. The re-
appearance of reforms on the agenda in the 1980s was made possible by the pressure 
of large budgetary deficits. 
 
Even though the two charters are presented as customer charters, the charters should 
in fact be considered as citizen charters. Where a citizen charter between citizens and 
politics or between citizens and the state was needed to remedy the crisis, the citizen 
charter was narrowed down to a customer charter between citizen/customer and 
administration. Attention for administrative reform should mainly be seen as an 
attempt to reframe the debate. General discontent had to be reframed to manageable 
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problems, one of them administrative reform. Tackling these newly defined problems 
could then serve as symbolic actions, symbols that ‘fulfil important functions in the 
maintenance of political order and stability’  ('t Hart 1993). Such a reframing strategy 
is not without certain dangers, as Lock et al. suggest that the supply side of public 
opinion should not be underestimated: what elites are saying and doing. Political 
discourse is therefore central to changing citizens’  evaluation of government (Lock et 
al. 1999: 258). The malfunctioning of the administration has always been present and 
citizens in Belgium have always treated their public services in a condescending way. 
It was only in the 1990s, however, that it managed to become a public issue or a 
public problem. Politicians’  role in putting it on the agenda should not be 
underestimated. 
The consequence of this reframing of the debate is that often-superficial action is 
taken. Crises in one sphere are countered by (re)actions in another. In our example: a 
political crisis is responded to by promoting well-published administrative reforms 
(e.g. the introduction of a charter, the announcement of a large-scale reform). This 
gives an impression of high performance, but does not necessarily create the desired 
results, or is not even intended to do so (Dubnick 2005). Administrative reform 
rhetoric, certainly after 1999, took a central position in the discourse on restoring 
trust, even though little was known on the actual contribution of administrative 
malfunctioning to citizens’  trust, a contribution that was certainly of another order 
than that of the functioning of the political system (Van de Walle and Bouckaert 
2003). Laegreid and Roness’  observation may therefore be correct: ‘Solutions are 
reforms proposals that may be considered as relevant, though they may not 
necessarily solve any problem if implemented’  (Laegreid and Roness 1999: 305). This 
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shows that government and politics do not only respond to crises, but also define and 
constitute crises (Hay 1996: 1192). 
 
Bringing administrative ailments to the centre of political discourse mainly served as 
a distraction:  
 
In difficult times of inflation, deficits and economic instability, the political 
authorities in the U.S. and in European societies found themselves severely 
rebuked by their citizens. To ward off attacks and to deflect criticism of their 
incapacity to solve society’ s pressing problems, they turned their wrath on 
their own state and on the way it was being managed. (Suleiman 2003: 4) 
 
Administrative reform not only had to distract attention. The crises also served as 
windows of opportunity for putting administrative reform on the political agenda. We 
deal with this aspect more in detail in the following section. 
 
THE REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES: THE POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR REFORM 
Why did a User Charter suddenly emerge in 1991, and why did 1999 see a pledge for 
administrative reform in the announcement of the Copernicus reform? Political crises 
are not the only possible explanation. In this section we will discuss the realignment 
of political forces that helped administrative reform conquer a prominent place on the 
political agenda, and thus made the proclamation of the two charters possible. 
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As to administrative reform we can currently identify two ideological antipodes in 
Belgian politics: the approach of the Flemish Liberal Democrats (VLD) on the one 
hand, the Walloon Socialist Party (PS) on the other. Both exemplify a different 
approach to the role and function of the public administration. As such, our ‘VLD’  
and ‘PS’  in this paragraph should be regarded as ideal-types of these approaches, and 
not necessarily as the political parties the acronyms stand for. The first approach 
generally corresponds to a New Public Management approach; the second 
corresponds to the dominant approach toward the public administration in 1980s in 
Belgium, where the administration is a political instrument.  
 
The Flemish Liberal Democrats (VLD, PVV up till 1992), are a Flemish centre-right 
political party. A classic liberal party, they are in favour of small government and free 
enterprise. The state against the citizen was the topic of their 1973 conference. Their 
support for administrative reform is mainly ideological, as reforms and administrative 
simplification are a first step toward a liberation of the citizen.  
 
The PS, or the Wallonian (French-speaking) socialist party has a dominant position in 
Southern Belgium. It stands for a paternalistic state system in socialist tradition, and 
secures its power by building a web of clientilist relations in public administrations by 
using public sector jobs as political rewards. This has always been common practice 
in the Belgian political-administrative system. Representativity of the administration 
is another key element in their approach. Their power structure is therefore the first 
one to suffer from administrative reforms, notably the abolishment of life-long tenure 
for civil servants. 
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The dramatic budgetary situation and international tendencies in the 1980s had their 
impact on the Belgian public sector and lead to the gradual emergence of reform 
initiatives. Despite internal reform, the dominant approach to the function of the 
public sector remained that we have summarized in the PS ideal-type. The policy 
monopoly thus had to be challenged to allow for change (Maesschalck 2002; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Verhofstadt’ s citizen manifesto helped give 
administrative reform a place on the political agenda, as did the economic situation 
that called for budgetary restraint. Administrative reforms in the 1980s and early 
1990s generally had an internal focus and moved only gradual, what made these 
reforms acceptable for the PS. 
 
The VLD had been in the opposition since 1987, and could thus not profit from the 
public administration in its dominant definition, namely the administration as a 
political instrument. As prospects for government membership were bleak, they could 
opt for an alternative strategy by trying to change the dominant definition of the 
public administration by stressing service delivery and quality. Such an approach 
would not necessarily help them, but it would at least help undermine the position of 
the government parties. Speaking about a gap between citizens and politics is a 
possible strategy for pushing one’ s own definition. 
 
The introduction of the User Charter and a series of customer–oriented reforms 
brought administrative reform on the political agenda and gave them an external 
outlook. This open challenge probably stimulated the PS to claim the function of 
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minister for the civil service after the 1995 elections, a function they had not held 
since 1980. The early-90s crisis had forced the party into accepting some broad 
reform, and forced them into a defensive strategy because reforms were also publicly 
announced, whereas previously they had a mere internal character. The elections in 
1995 signalled the end of the reform dynamic that suffered from a lack of political 
interest very soon after the introduction of the User Charter. 
At the same time, successful administrative reforms were being implemented at the 
Flemish regional level. One of the leading figures was Luc Van Den Bossche, a 
Flemish socialist, and minister for the civil service. At the regional level, the Flemish 
socialists, were able to implement reforms, while at the federal level they were 
dominated by their French-speaking counterpart and sister-party. This shows that 
party’ s attitudes toward the administration cannot just be reduced to ideological 
differences: We aforementioned the different approach of the Wallonian and Flemish 
Socialists; also the Liberals take a different approach to administrative reform in the 
Flemish and Wallonian part of the country: whereas VLD is, at least in Flanders, the 
main promoter of reform, its Wallonian counterpart MR has always neglected the 
issue and has never actively supported nor hindered any reforms. 
 
The 1999 elections brought the Liberals to power. The Socialists also entered 
government (as did the Greens), but had suffered a defeat in the elections. This 
dramatically reduced their power and bargaining position in the government. This 
allowed liberals to promote their approach to administrative reform, supported by 
strong popular support for reform due to the recent crisis (cf. supra). Without the 
crisis and the loss of influence of the PS, reforms would probably have been 
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implemented as well, but they would not have had such a public outreach as they did 
now by presenting the reform as a genuine promise or charter. New prime minister 
was liberal Guy Verhofstadt who had a strong personal interest in administrative 
reforms. The new minister for the civil service and the modernisation of the public 
administration was Van Den Bossche, who had successfully reformed the Flemish 
regional administration. Only in this combination of political forces the much-
publicized Copernicus reform could be presented to the public as a new charter. The 
Copernicus survey and communication initiative made it impossible for the PS to 
voice its protest, because a socialist (be it a Flemish one) would lead the reform. A 
reform project with a mere internal orientation (i.e. reforms without embedding them 
in a new charter) would have been much easier to sabotage (but there would have 
been less need to do so).  
The initial strengths of the Copernicus reform –a prime minister that identified 
himself with the success of his project, and a straightforward-type of minister for 
modernisation of the administration to push through reforms- would soon prove to be 
its weaknesses. The style of the minister for administrative modernisation was 
effective though not appreciated. Criticism of the Copernicus reform was considered 
as an attack on the prime minister, for whom the success of the reforms became an 
obsession.  
 
Discontent with the reforms increased and the PS managed to increase its power. The 
Copernicus reform gradually lost its charter characteristics as the first massive 
communication initiative was soon forgotten, and a new marketing initiative turned 
out to be impossible due to intra-governmental disagreement. Press attention for the 
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reform, that was at first rather general, declined and the Copernicus project soon 
became a reform project with a mainly internal focus. A number of politically 
motivated high-level appointments took away most support Copernicus initially had 
among the main opposition party. 
 
Opposition against Copernicus increased and culminated just before the 2003 
elections. The PS, and the socialist group at large, strengthened its influence, and 
claimed the function of minister for the civil service. One of the first acts of the new 
minister was to declare Copernicus dead, but in the meantime administrative reform 
had conquered a permanent place on the political agenda. Dropping Copernicus 
should therefore be seen as having a symbolic function, because, internally, reforms 
slowly continue. An absence of external communication and marketing of the reforms 
allowed the PS to save its face. Reform rhetoric and actual reform are thus clearly 
different. Copernicus focused on the reform rhetoric (e.g. the pledge for reform) while 
present rhetoric is mainly anti-Copernicus. Actual reform however has not changed 
dramatically.  
 
The PS has political reasons not to put administrative reform on the agenda, as 
reforms would estrange part of its supporters. It is however unable to uphold its initial 
positions, as it will probably not manage to take it off the agenda. Therefore, its new 
strategy of stressing the social functions of public services seems to be an attempt not 
only to safeguard these social functions, but also to hinder other reforms with a heavy 
focus on NPM.  
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We can therefore conclude that if any further charters or charter-like initiatives will be 
introduced, their content will be different. The two charters we have discussed in this 
article aimed at placing administrative reform and quality of public services on the 
political agenda. Quality was narrowly defined as customer-service and customer 
friendliness. A new charter will not so much deal with whether administrative reform 
is necessary, and whether quality is desirable, but instead with the question what kind 
of quality we desire. Absence of any customer perspective in public services before 
the late 1980s allowed for a greater emphasis on the customer in the 1993 and 1999 
charter. In the future, political discussions will focus on the compatibility of customer 
and citizen perspectives when engaging in administrative reform. The clash between 
VLD and PS in 2003 was the first visible expression of the incompatibility of their 
views: VLD introduced some of the new public management discourse in Belgian 
politics, while the PS has recently embarked upon a rhetoric that contains elements of 
the new public service doctrine. In general, we could regard the new public service 
movement as a reaction to the NPM discourse, and it seems as if the PS has only 
come to adopt and promote the entire new public service discourse (especially the 
emphasis on the general interest) in reaction to the VLD’ s NPM adherence. 
 
Political crises had their impact on the issue salience of administrative reform. They 
allowed the parties involved to diverge from the traditional approach toward the 
administration without loosing face. At the same time they allowed entrepreneurs to 
jump on the bandwagon and push their point as a long-term vision on administrative 
reform was practically absent and there thus was a vacuum to be filled. 
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CONCLUSION 
Has the introduction of the charters been successful? The 1993 User Charter 
disappeared quickly from the agenda, and the second charter (Copernicus) collapsed 
because of political disagreement. Yet, it looks as if administrative reform has 
conquered its place on the political agenda. No matter what the political constellation, 
many initiatives to improve customer friendliness were gradually being implemented 
during the 90s. 
 
The late 1990s were characterized by several favourable preconditions for reform: 
x Bottom-up pressure for reforms, both from citizens as a reaction to scandals 
and overall failing administrative performance, and from young civil servants 
who felt they could not function or pursue a career in the present civil service. 
x Agreement among political parties about the necessity of reforms. Resistance 
could only come from the Christian Democrats as main opposition party, who 
were however paralysed as they were suffering from their electoral defeat, 
driving them from government for the first time in 40 years. 
x A prime minister who declared the reforms one of the spearheads of his 
policy, assisted by a minister for the civil service with a hard-liner reputation 
when it comes to forcing implementation. 
x A budgetary situation that allowed for investments and budget increases. 
 
Both charters saw the light in a period of disturbed relations between citizens and 
politics. The introduction of a User Charter in 1993 and the launch of the Copernicus 
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reform in 1999 definitely were political events, rather than mere administrative ones. 
A charter was needed to restore citizen-government relations. As for the first charter, 
the gap between citizens and government had to be bridged; and for the second there 
was a need to make the country a model-state. In both cases, the primary instrument 
was a contract between user and administration. The occurrence of political crises had 
two results: administrative reform could be used as a flare for public discontent, and 
this strategy strengthened the position of the reform proponents. The crises served as a 
window of opportunity for some political actors to promote their views (Aberbach and 
Christensen 2001; Kingdon 1984). 
 
Certainly, we do not claim that the charters were introduced purely for political 
reasons. Charters were being introduced all over Europe. Public administrations in 
Europe found themselves in the age of administrative reform (Wright 1994: 104). The 
choice for a charter to ward off criticism on the political system is therefore not that 
surprising, as Belgian policy-makers may have found their inspiration abroad and may 
not have wanted to be seen as less innovative than their European colleagues (Wright 
1994: 108). 
 
Even though the charters made substantive use of the ‘client’  and ‘citizen’  
terminology, it does not mean the content of administrative reforms has changed 
dramatically over the years. The main change is one in the motivation for reform. 
During almost all reforms in the Belgian public sector, the same deficiencies have 
been identified, but while the reason for reform was first motivated by a concern 
about the ever-growing public sector and the increasing political influence, 
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motivations later shifted to a response to budgetary pressures (1980s) and to concerns 
for citizens’  trust in government. So what was changing were the ‘views and theories 
about the causes and sources of inefficiency in government, what efficiency meant, 
and how it was to be achieved’  (Cheung 1996: 37). 
While the pledge for reform is a central element in the attempts to put administrative 
reform on the political agenda, it has weaknesses at the same time: the pledge is an 
open and direct attack on the existing model of the public administration and does as 
such cause opponents to loose face. A charter that merely states a number of quality 
standards, is not threat. When the charter defines the role of government and touches 
values of the public administration, however, it is perceived as a threat. The 
Copernicus reform was a much-publicized reform. A general and broad 
announcement of the reforms can signal that there is broad political support for the 
reform, and a clear model supporting the reforms. This was clearly not the case in 
Belgium. The marketing of Copernicus was mainly used to put opponents before a fait 
accompli: what party or trade union would dare to oppose the results of the 
Copernicus referendum? This approach helped to force the issue on the agenda, but 
also provoked a reaction, as was the case in 1995. In the absence of broad support and 
agreement on the reform model, incremental and quiet reform may be the best 
strategy (see e.g. the case of Canada in Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 224-231). And 
that is exactly were Belgium has landed presently: the main principles of the 
Copernicus reform still stand under the new minister, but much of the reform rhetoric 
has been dropped. 
 
 
A tale of two charters 
 31 
 
References 
 
Aberbach, J.D. and Christensen, T. (2001) ‘Radical Reform in New Zealand: Crisis, Windows of 
Opportunity, and Rational Actors’ . Public Administration, 79:2 pp403-422. 
Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Belgisch Staatsblad (22 Jan. 1993) Handvest van de Gebruiker van de Openbare Diensten. 
Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge, Garden City New York: Doubleday. 
Bouckaert, G. (1995) Charters as Frameworks for Awarding Quality: the Belgian, British and French 
Experience in H. Hill and H. Klages (eds.) Trends in Public Sector Renewal: Recent 
Developments and Concepts of Awarding Excellence, pp185-200. Frankfurt am Main: Peter 
Lang. 
Bouckaert, G., François, A., Wauters, A., Bonafini, E., Poullet, E., De Visscher, C.., Polet, R. and 
Bonafini, E. (1999) Modernisering van de Overheidsinstellingen: De Onderzoeksvragen. 
Efficiëntie, Effectiviteit en Legitimiteit van het Overheidsoptreden. Brussel: Instituut voor de 
Overheid, AURA and DWTC. 
Bouckaert, G. and Thijs, N. (2003) Kwaliteit in de Overheid, een Handboek voor 
Kwaliteitsmanagement in de Publieke Sector o.b.v. een Internationaal Comparatieve Studie, 
Brussel: Academia Press. 
Bouckaert, G., Thijs, N. and van Dooren, W. (2004) Quality Management and Management of Quality 
in the European Public Administrations in E. Löffler and M. Vintar (eds.) Improving the 
Quality of East and Western European Public Services, pp91-106. Hampshire: Ashgate. 
A tale of two charters 
 32 
Bouckaert, G. and Van de Walle, S. (2003) ‘Comparing Measures of Citizen Trust and User 
Satisfaction as Indicators of 'Good Governance': Difficulties in Linking Trust and Satisfaction 
Indicators’ . International Review of Administrative Sciences, 69:3 pp329-344. 
Bouckaert, G. and Vandeweyer, S. (1999) Kwaliteit in de Overheid, Brugge: Die Keure. 
Brans, M. and Hondeghem, A. (1999) The Senior Civil Service in Belgium in E. C. Page and V. 
Wright, V. (eds.) Bureaucratic Elites in Western European States, pp121-46. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
Cheung, A.B.L. (1996) ‘Efficiency as the Rhetoric: Public-Sector Reform in Hong-Kong Explained’ . 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 62:1 pp31-47. 
Dierickx, G. (2003) ‘Senior Civil Servants and Bureaucratic Change in Belgium’ . Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 16:3 pp321-348. 
Dubnick, M. (2005, forthcoming) ‘Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of 
Mechanisms’ . Public Performance and Management Review, 28:3. 
Ducpetiaux, E. (1955 (1859)) ‘Etude sur la Réforme Administrative’ . Revue Internationale des 
Sciences Administratives, 21:3 pp566-590. 
Federale Regering (1999) Het Vertrouwen verder Versterken: Federale Regeringsverklaring, Brussel. 
Gelders, D. and Van de Walle, S. (2005, forthcoming) ‘Marketing Government Reforms’ . Journal of 
Nonprofit and Public Sector Marketing, 14:1/2. 
Hay, C. (1996). ‘Labouring under a Misconception: The Discursive Construction of the 'Winter of 
Discontent'. Proceedings of the British Political Science Association Annual Conference. 
Kingdon, J.W. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Boston: Little Brown. 
Laegreid, P. and Roness, P.G. (1999) Administrative Reform as Organized Attention in M. Egeberg 
and P. Laegreid (eds.) Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen, pp301-
A tale of two charters 
 33 
329. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. 
Lock, S.T., Shapiro, R.Y. and Jacobs, L.R. (1999) ‘The Impact of Political Debate on Government 
Trust: Reminding the Public what the Federal Government Does’ . Political Behavior, 21:3 
pp239-264. 
Lutgen, G. (1986) Stratégie d'Actions Prioritaires pour la Modernisation des Services Publics. 
Bruxelles: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Modernisation et à l'Informatisation des Services Publics. 
Maesschalck, J. (2002) ‘When do Scandals have an Impact on Policy Making? A Case Study of the 
Police Reform Following the Dutroux Scandal in Belgium’ . International Public Management 
Journal, 5:2 pp169-193. 
Maesschalck, J., Hondeghem, A. and Pelgrims, C. (2002) ‘De Evolutie naar een “Nieuw Politieke 
Cultuur” in België: Een Beleidswetenschappelijke Analyse’ . Beleidswetenschap, 16:4 pp295-
317. 
McGuire, L. ( 2002) Service charters: global convergence of national divergence.  Public Management 
Review, 3:4 pp493-524. 
Ministry of Finance Public Management Departement (1997) Service Charter - a Finnish Model. 
Helsinki: Ministry of Finance. 
Piraux, A. (2004) Copernic, son imaginaire et ses pratiques. Pyramides, 8 pp29-51. 
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2004) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, second edition. 
Staes, P. and Legrand, J.-J. (1998) Het Handvest van de Gebruiker van de Openbare Diensten, Brussel: 
Federaal Ministerie van Ambtenarenzaken/Labor. 
Stenmans, A. (1999) La Transformation de la Fonction Administative en Belgique: Administration 
Publique et Société, Bruxelles: CRISP. 
A tale of two charters 
 34 
Suleiman, E. (2003) Dismantling Democratic States, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
’t Hart, P. (1993) ‘Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management’ . Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 1:1 pp36-50. 
Torres, L. and Pina, V. (2003) ‘Service Charters: Reshaping the Government-Citizen Relationship: The 
Case of Spain’ . Paper Presented at the EGPA Annual Conference (Oeiras, Portugal), Study 
Group II. 
Van de Walle, S. and Bouckaert, G. (2003) ‘Public Service Performance and Trust in Government: The 
Problem of Causality’ . International Journal of Public Administration  26:8-9 pp891-913. 
Verhofstadt, G. (1991) Burgermanifest, S.l.: S.n. 
Walgrave, S. and Rihoux, B. (1998) ‘De Witte Burgers over Justitie en de Zaak-Dutroux’ . De Orde van 
de Dag: Criminaliteit en Samenleving, 2 pp24-30. 
Wright, V. (1994) ‘Reshaping the State: The Implications for Public Administration’ . West European 
Politics, 17:3 pp102-137. 
X. (02 Oct. 1999) ‘Interview met Guy Verhofstadt’ . Het Laatste Nieuws. 
 
 
A tale of two charters 
 35 
Table 1: principles of the Belgian charter. 
1. Transparency 
 
 
 Provision of information 
 
 Consultation of Administrative documents 
 
2. Flexibility 
 
 
 Accessibility 
x reception and qualitative contacts 
x clear and precise language 
x clear legislation 
 
 
 Adapted service 
x automatic adjunction of rights 
x motivated administrative decisions 
x automatic transfer of documents to the competent level 
x qualitative service: staff should be able to perform intelligibly, 
linguistically and physically 
 
3. Legal protection 
 
 
 protection of privacy 
 
 opportunity to be heard 
 
 processing of complaints 
 
 speed of payments 
 
 contestation of decisions 
 
 suspend execution of administrative decision  
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Figure 1: satisfaction with the way democracy works in Belgium, 1973-2004, Standard Eurobarometer 
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Figure 2: stages in administrative reform 
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Figure 3: the birth of a crisis (% of trust in the federal government) 
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APPENDIX 1: COUNTRY FILE EVENTS BELGIUM 
 General Organization Personnel Finance 
1981- 
1985 
 
 
 
 
1985- 
1990 
- Martens: PM (Christen-  
   Democrats) (1981) 
- Economic recovery actions 
(1982)  
 
 
-Martens: PM (Christen-
democrats) (1985) 
-Martens: PM (Christen-
democrats) (1987) 
-Martens: PM (Christen-
democrats) (1988) 
 
 
-Territorial Reform. Creation of 
Communities and Regions (1980) 
 
 
 
 
-State Secretary for modernization and 
information added to the Prime Minster 
(1985-1988) 
-Corps of public sector advisors (1989), 
later in office for organisation and 
management (ABC) (1995) 
- Report on the modernisation of the 
civil service (1986) 
- Creation of the modernization 
secretariat (1986) 
- Creation of modernizing cells in the 
federal administration (1987)  
- Territorial Reform. Extension of 
competences (1988-1989) 
- Appointment of the first minister of 
the Civil Service (1989) 
-Creation of the college of secretary-
general (1989) 
-More autonomy for communities 
and regions (1980) 
 
 
 
 
-Creation of a school for finance and 
tax law within the ministry of 
finance (1987) 
-Policy for equality for men and 
women established (1990) 
-Restructuring of departmental 
budgets (1981) 
-Corrections to the governmental 
formulation process of the budget 
(1981) 
 
-Program budgeting (1985) 
-Finance Law (1989) 
-Zero Base Budgeting (1990-1995) 
 
1991- 
1995 
 
 
-Martens: PM (Christen-
democrats) (1991) 
- Law on the motivation on 
administrative actions (1991) 
- Law on the reform of state 
companies (1991)  
-Dehaene: PM (Christen-
democrats) (1992) 
 
-Radioscopie; Audit of the federal 
departments (1991-1993) 
-Creation of autonomous government 
companies (1991) 
-Creation of the ministry of civil service 
(1995) 
-Creation of internal audit cells (1995) 
 
-Reform of the Office for selection 
and recruitment (1991) 
-Radioscopie, restructuring of wages, 
career opportunities and number of 
personnel (1993) 
-“Tobback plan”: recruitment stop, 
stimulating mobility    
-APKB: Royal Decree on General 
 
- Law on the state accountability 
(1991)  
-Maastricht convergence criteria  
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-Restrictions on public spending 
(1992) 
-Reducing public debt(1992) 
- Charter of the user of public 
services (1993) 
- Appointment of information 
officers  
- Law on the access on 
information (1994) 
- Dehaene: PM (Christen-
democrats) (1995) 
- Appointment of the federal 
ombudsmen (1995) 
 
Principles. New statute for civil 
servants (1994) 
1996- 
1998 
 
-Creation Agency for 
Administrative simplification 
(1998) 
-Satisfaction barometer 
(common quality measurement 
tool for the federal public 
service, 1998) 
-Restructuring plans for the federal 
ministries (2000)  
-Reform of the institute for education 
and training of the federal civil 
service (1996) 
-“Flahaut plan”: instructions on 
recruitment, evaluation, mobility, 
vacation and education (1997) 
-Introduction evaluation system 
(1997-1998) 
-Law on the social security system and 
the pension system (1996) 
-Commission on the normalisation of 
the accountability (1998) 
-Changing role of the financial 
inspectors (1998) 
-Creation of the office of public debt 
(1998) 
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1999- 
2002 
 
 
-Verhofstadt: PM (Lib.) (1999) 
-Appointment of a minister of 
administrative reform (1999) 
-Action plan for the 
administrative simplification 
and the appointment of a 
government commissioner 
(1999) 
-Introduction of the Copernicus 
reform plan (2000) 
-Introducing the Common 
Assessment Framework in the 
public service (2000-2001) 
-Organization of a quality 
conference for all public 
services in Belgium (2001) 
 
-Creation of horizontal, vertical and 
programmatorial ministries (2001) 
-Reduction and abolishment of 
ministerial cabinets (2001) 
-Creation of new structures in new 
ministries, management board and 
direction board (2001) 
-Business Process Reengineering 
in all new ministries (2001-2003)  
 
-New APKB: principles for the 
statute of the civil servants (2000)   
-Creation of HRM cells in the federal 
ministries (2000) 
- Appointment of HRM-officers for 
the federal ministries (2000) 
-Reform of the recruitment and 
selection office (Selor) (2000) 
- Separation of the selection and 
recruitment process and the 
enlargement of competences for the 
ministries (2000)  
-Introduction of a mandate system 
for top managers (2000) 
-Public Management Programme: 
education programme for young high 
potentials (2000) 
-Assessment for top managers (or 
“top management”(2000-2003)   
 
-Introduction of a new budgeting and 
control cycle (2000) 
- Creation of the office of budgeting 
and control separate from the ministry 
of finance (2000) 
-Creation of an internal audit service 
at each ministry (2000)   
 
 
